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Abstract
We present new algorithms for determining optimal strategies for two-player games with proba-
bilistic moves and reachability winning conditions. Such games, known as simple stochastic games,
were extensively studied by A.Condon [2,3]. Many interesting problems, including parity games
and hence also mu-calculus model checking, can be reduced to simple stochastic games. It is an
open problem, whether simple stochastic games can be solved in polynomial time.
Our algorithms determine the optimal expected payoﬀs in the game. We use geometric interpre-
tation of the search space as a subset of the hyper-cube [0, 1]N . The main idea is to divide this
set into convex subregions in which linear optimization methods can be used. We show how one
can proceed from one subregion to the other so that, eventually, a region containing the optinal
payoﬀs will be found. The total number of subregions is exponential in the size of the game but,
in practice, the algorithms need to visit only few of them to ﬁnd a solution.
We believe that our new algorithms could provide new insights into the diﬃcult problem of deter-
mining algorithmic complexity of simple stochastic games and other, equivallent problems.
Keywords: inﬁnite graph games, parity games, simple stochastic games, ﬁnding optimal
strategies, successive approximation.
1 Introduction
Many problems studied in computer science have an elegant presentation in
a form of two-player graph games with various winning conditions. This in-
cludes veriﬁcation of open components, controller synthesis and also theory of
alternating automata. Hence a question of ﬁnding eﬃcient algorithms for solv-
ing graph games, i.e., for deciding which player possess a winning strategy and
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2 This work is supported by Games for Processes project (VR grant 621–2002–455).
Electronic Notes in Theoretical Computer Science 119 (2005) 51–65
1571-0661      © 2005 Elsevier B.V. 
www.elsevier.com/locate/entcs
doi:10.1016/j.entcs.2004.07.008
Open access under CC BY-NC-ND license. 
possibly ﬁnding this strategy, becomes important. The problem was exten-
sively studied for games with a wide range of winning conditions: from simple
safety/reachability objectives to ω-regular ones expressed by either Bu¨chi/co-
Bu¨chi or most general parity conditions [9,15,14,4,8,13,5]. A long standing
open question in this area is whether it is possible to solve games with parity
winning conditions in polynomial time. Through known reductions [12], a
positive answer to this question would also mean that the mu-calculus model
checking can be done in polynomial time.
In this paper we focus on simple stochastic games [2]. These are two-player,
turn-based games with random moves. The objective in the game is to reach
a ﬁnal position (a sink) with the best possible associated payoﬀ. Thus, rather
than looking for a winning strategy, we want to ﬁnd an optimal strategy, that
is a strategy which guarantees the best expected payoﬀ for a player.
We are interested in this kind of games because, on the one hand, other
important graph games, like parity and mean-payoﬀ games, can be easily
reduced to simple stochastic games. On the other hand, simple stochastic
games are instances of general stochastic games which have a rich and well
developed theory. We believe that this link between an old area of operational
research and the current studies can provide new insights into the problem of
the complexity of graph games. Simple stochastic games are also interesting as
a model for open, probabilistic components. Eﬃcient algorithms for solving
simple stochastic games can be used for veriﬁcation of such components or
even for synthesis of components meeting given speciﬁcation.
Over the years, many algorithms has been proposed, which solve (simple)
stochastic games. Many of them were later shown to be incorrect [3]. The
correct ones, usually don’t have any satisfactory complexity analysis. The two
main methods used in these algorithms are the strategy improvement method
and solving the local optimality equations.
Strategy improvement was developed by Hoﬀman and Karp for general
stochastic games [7]. In this method an initial strategy for one of the players
is improved in each iteration by switching it at positions at which choices are
not locally optimal.
The other method is based on solving a system of constraints for the op-
timal expected payoﬀs in the game, which we call local optimality equations.
Having optimal payoﬀs, one can easily reconstruct optimal strategies. For
one-player games, the local optimality equations are linear, hence such games
can be solved in polynomial time using linear programming techniques [6]. For
two-player games the constraints are no longer linear and thus other methods
are used, usually some form of iterative approximation.
We propose two algorithms which are based on the second method. For a
R. Somla / Electronic Notes in Theoretical Computer Science 119 (2005) 51–6552
game with N positions the vector of optimal expected payoﬀs is an element
of a hyper-cube [0, 1]N . Moreover, it is a maximal point of a set W of feasible
vectors, described by the local optimality equations. Our main idea is to
divide set W into subregions in which the equations become linear. This
allows one to ﬁnd in a polynomial time a maximal element in each subregion.
Using this fact we show how to iterate through the subregions in such a way
that eventually the subregion containing the optimal vector will be found.
We prove that this must happen after at most an exponential number of
iterations. In practice, we couldn’t ﬁnd any examples, including those known
from the literature [3,10], which would require more than a polynomial number
of iterations. To evaluate the eﬃciency of our algorithms we have implemented
them and run on example simple stochastic games. In these test runs we
show that our algorithms perform comparably to the strategy improvement
methods.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 contains basic
deﬁnitions and properties of simple stochastic games. The existence of the
optimal value and memoryless determinacy of the game is stated here. We
present ﬁrst of our algorithms in Section 3. We prove its convergence to the op-
timal solution and also prove that the number of iterations of the algorithm is
bounded by the number of diﬀerent strategies in the game. Section 4 describes
our second algorithm. It is a modiﬁcation of the ﬁrst algorithm which replaces
costly solving of linear optimization problems by much simpler computations.
We prove convergence of this simpliﬁed version of the algorithm and argue
that the number of iterations is at most exponential in the size of the game.
In Section 5 we describe the strategy improvement algorithms which we use as
yardsticks to measure performance of our algorithms. Section 6 summarizes
results of our experiments.
2 Simple Stochastic Games
Simple stochastic games are played by two players max and min on a game
board G consisting of a ﬁnite directed graph of game positions. An edge in G
indicates a possible move in the game. If a play reaches a sink s of G then it
stops and player max wins from player min a payoﬀ p(s) ∈ [0, 1] associated
with that sink. 3 Let S be the set of all sinks of G. The remaining positions
V are divided into strategic and average (or random) ones. At a strategic
position one of the players chooses the next move. Let Vmax and Vmin be
3 In the standard deﬁnition of a simple stochastic game there are only two sinks—the 0-sink
and the 1-sink. Player max wins a play if it ends in the 1-sink. Here we use a generalized
version of the game (cf. [3, p. 53])
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Fig. 1. Example game board. Black circles represent min-player nodes, white ones are
max-player nodes. Gray squares represent average nodes. There are three sinks with pay-
oﬀs 1, 0 and 1, respectively.
sets of positions where player max and min, respectively, makes a decision.
At an average position x ∈ Vavg the next move is chosen randomly with a
given probability distribution q(x, ·) over successors of x. Figure 1 presents
an example game board with three average positions x, y and z, one min
position a and one max position b. Three sinks on this board are labelled
with their respective payoﬀs. Edges going out of average nodes are labelled
with probabilities of their successors.
For each (nonterminal) position x game G(x) starts at x and is played
until a sink is reached. Hence a play of G(x) is a maximal path x, x1, x2, . . .
in the graph G. If it ends in a sink s then the outcome of the play is p(s)
and player max is interested in maximizing this outcome while min wants to
minimize it.
A strategy for a player describes the choices which that player makes during
a play of the game. In this paper we consider only deterministic, memoryless
strategies which select the next move based on the current position, ignoring
the history of a play.
Deﬁnition 2.1 [strategies] A strategy for a player P ∈ {max,min} is a
function σ : VP → V ∪S such that x → σ(x) for all x ∈ VP . A play x0, x1, . . .
of the game G(x0) conforms to σ if xi+1 = σ(xi) for all xi ∈ VP .
In what follows, we will often consider valuations v : V → [0, 1] of game
positions. When necessary, we extend such a valuation to game sinks with the
payoﬀ function p. The extension of v will be written as v¯. Given a valuation
we can speak about greedy strategies which make locally optimal choices with
respect to that valuation.
Deﬁnition 2.2 [greedy strategies] Let v : V → R be a node valuation. A
max player strategy σ is v-greedy at x ∈ Vmax if v¯
(
σ(x)
)
= maxx→y v¯(y).
A min player strategy τ is v-greedy at x ∈ Vmin if v¯
(
τ(x)
)
= minx→y v¯(y).
Finally, a strategy for a player P is v-greedy if it is v-greedy at each x ∈ VP .
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Even when both players ﬁx their strategies there are many possible plays
due to the random choices made at average positions. Let σ and τ be strategies
for players max and min, respectively. In a standard way edge probabilities
induce a probability measure over plays conforming to σ and τ . Let qσ,τ (x, s)
be the probability that a play of G(x) conforming to σ and τ ends in a sink s.
Deﬁnition 2.3 [expected payoﬀs] Let σ and τ be strategies for max and
min, respectively. The expected payoﬀ vσ,τ (x) ∈ [0, 1] in the game G(x) when
players use strategies σ and τ is deﬁned by
vσ,τ (x) =
∑
s∈S
qσ,τ (x, s) · p(s).
Observe that implicit in this deﬁnition is the fact that an inﬁnite play results
in a payoﬀ of 0.
Looking at the probability distribution over plays of G(x) it is not hard to
verify the following fact.
Proposition 2.4 The vector vσ,τ of expected payoﬀs is a ﬁxed point of an
operator Fσ,τ : (V → [0, 1])→ (V → [0, 1]) given by
Fσ,τ (v) x =


v¯
(
σ(x)
)
if x ∈ Vmax,
v¯
(
τ(x)
)
if x ∈ Vmin,∑
x→y q(x, y) · v¯(y) if x ∈ Vavg.
Optimal strategies are deﬁned in the usual way. It turns out that for simple
stochastic games it is enough to consider memoryless strategies.
Deﬁnition 2.5 [optimal strategies/values] Strategies σ∗, τ∗ are optimal at x
if
vσ,τ∗(x) ≤ vσ∗,τ∗(x) ≤ vσ∗,τ (x)
for any σ and τ . The expected payoﬀ vopt(x) = vσ∗,τ∗(x) is called an optimal
value of the game G(x) and is easily shown to be unique if it exists. Strategies
σ and τ are optimal if they are optimal at every position in G.
The existence of the optimal value was proven by Shapley for general
stochastic games [11] and later, by Condon, for the class of simple stochastic
games [2]. The important assumption in these proofs is that a play of a game
is ﬁnite with probability 1. 4
4 Using more advanced proof techniques, it is possible to obtain similar results also for
non-stopping games. See e.g. a chapter on Positive Stochastic Games in [6].
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Deﬁnition 2.6 [stopping game] G is a stopping game board if
∑
s∈S qσ,τ (x, s) =
1 for any x, σ and τ . That is, for any x, a play of G(x) stops at a sink with
probability 1 regardless of what strategies are used by the players.
The vector of optimal values of a stopping simple stochastic game is the
only solution to the local optimality equations, as stated in the following
theorem.
Theorem 2.7 (Shapley,Condon) Let G be a stopping game board and let
F : (V → [0, 1])→ (V → [0, 1]) be given by
F (v) x =


maxx→y v¯(y) if x ∈ Vmax,
minx→y v¯(y) if x ∈ Vmin,∑
x→y q(x, y) · v¯(y) if x ∈ Vavg.
The operator F has a unique ﬁxed point v∗ and v∗(x) is the optimal value of
G(x) for all x ∈ V .
Proof (sketch). If G is a stopping game board with N non-terminal positions
then the probability of reaching a sink in the ﬁrst N steps of a play is at least
mN , where m is the least edge probability in G. This implies that an operator
FN is contracting, that is, ‖FN(v)− FN(w)‖ ≤ (1−mN ) ‖v−w‖, where the
norm ‖v‖ of v : V → R is deﬁned by ‖v‖ = maxx∈V |v(x)|. It follows that FN ,
and hence also F , has a unique ﬁxed point v∗.
Let σ∗ and τ∗ be v∗-greedy strategies. For any strategy σ for player max
we have
Fσ,τ∗
(
vσ∗,τ∗
)
x ≤ F (vσ∗,τ∗
)
x = Fσ∗,τ∗
(
vσ∗,τ∗
)
x = vσ∗,τ∗(x)
for all x. Observe that Fσ,τ∗ is monotonic with respect to a partial order on
V → [0, 1] deﬁned by v  v′ iﬀ v(x) ≤ v′(x) for all x. Hence, by Knaster-
Tarski theorem, the unique ﬁxed point of Fσ,τ∗ , which is vσ,τ∗ , must be 
than vσ∗,τ∗ . By similar argument we show that vσ∗,τ∗  vσ∗,τ for any min
player strategy τ . This proves that strategies σ∗ and τ∗ are optimal. Since
vσ∗,τ∗ = Fσ∗,τ∗
(
vσ∗,τ∗
)
= F
(
vσ∗,τ∗
)
and F has a unique ﬁxed point, it follows
that v∗ = vσ∗,τ∗ . 
We note the following useful facts about optimal values and strategies.
Proposition 2.8 Let G be a stopping game board and let vopt(x) be the opti-
mal value of G(x) for each x. The following are equivalent:
(a) strategies σ and τ are optimal,
(b) vσ,τ = vopt,
R. Somla / Electronic Notes in Theoretical Computer Science 119 (2005) 51–6556
(c) strategies σ and τ are vσ,τ -greedy.
(d) strategies σ and τ are vopt-greedy,
Proof. Implication (a) ⇒ (b) follows by the uniqueness of the optimal value of
a simple stochastic game. From (b) it follows that Fσ,τ (vσ,τ ) = vopt = F (vσ,τ ),
i.e., σ and τ are vσ,τ -greedy. If (c) holds then F (vσ,τ ) = Fσ,τ (vσ,τ ) = vσ,τ .
Hence, by Theorem 2.7, vσ,τ = vopt and thus (d) also holds. Implication
(d)⇒ (a) was proven as a part of the proof of Theorem 2.7. 
Implication (d) ⇒ (a) of Proposition 2.8 shows how one can reconstruct
optimal strategies knowing the optimal values of the game. The equivalence
(a)⇔ (c) gives a polynomial procedure for deciding whether given strategies σ
and τ are optimal: ﬁnd the vector vσ,τ by solving linear equations v = Fσ,τ (v)
and then check if σ and τ are vσ,τ -greedy.
Corollary 2.9 The problem of ﬁnding optimal strategies/values of a stopping
simple stochastic game is in NP.
From now on we restrict our attention to games played on a stopping game
board.
3 Finding Optimal Values
From Theorem 2.7 we know that the vector of optimal values of a stopping
game G is the unique ﬁxed point of the operator
F (v) x =


maxx→y v¯(y) if x ∈ Vmax,
minx→y v¯(y) if x ∈ Vmin,∑
x→y q(x, y) · v¯(y) if x ∈ Vavg.
Since F is -monotonic it follows, by Knaster-Tarski theorem, that its ﬁxed
point is a supremum of all the pre-ﬁxed points of F . In other words, the vector
of optimal values is a maximal point in a region W of the hyper-cube [0, 1]V
deﬁned by
W =
{
v : V → [0, 1] ∣∣ v  F (v)}.
In order to ﬁnd this maximal point, we propose to divide W into subregions
in which F is linear. This way the linear programming techniques can be used
in each subregion to speed-up successive approximation of the optimal values.
For given strategies σ and τ , let
Wσ,τ =
{
v ∈ W ∣∣ 〈σ, τ〉 are v-greedy}.
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Observe that F restricted to Wσ,τ is the same as Fσ,τ which is linear. Note
also that diﬀerent subregions Wσ,τ have disjoint interiors and that all the
subregions sum up to W . The number of diﬀerent sub-regions is the same as
the number of diﬀerent strategies and is exponential in the size of the game.
Our algorithm iterates through the subregions of W until it ﬁnds one
corresponding to optimal strategies. In each iteration a new subregion is
visited and this new subregion is determined using a maximal point of the
current one. This maximal point is found by solving a linear program.
Algorithm 1 (improved iteration I)
1. Start with v1 = F (0).
2. Find vi-greedy strategies 〈σi, τi〉. Stop if 〈σi, τi〉 are optimal.
3. Find a valuation v which maximizes
∑
x v(x) and satisﬁes the linear con-
straints:
(a) vi  v,
(b) strategies 〈σi, τi〉 are v-greedy,
(c) v  Fσi,τi(v).
4. Take vi+1 = F (v) and repeat.
The convergence of the ﬁrst algorithm to the optimal values easily follows
from the following observations.
Lemma 3.1 Suppose that vn ∈ W . If vn  v  F (v) and vn+1 = F (v) then
F (vn)  vn+1 and vn+1 ∈ W .
Proof. This is a trivial consequence of F being monotonic: F (vn)  vn+1
follows from vn  v and vn+1  F (vn+1) follows from v  vn+1 = F (v). 
Proposition 3.2 If {vn} ⊆ W and F (vn)  vn+1 then limn→∞ vn = vopt.
Proof. For each x the sequence vn(x) is bounded and monotonic, hence it
converges to some value v(x) ∈ [0, 1]. Since F (vn−1)  vn  F (vn) it follows
that v = F (v) and therefore, by Theorem 2.7, v = vopt. 
Next, we show that the algorithm never visits the same subregion twice,
from which it follows that it terminates after at most an exponential number
of iterations.
Proposition 3.3 Let v0  v1  v2  · · ·  vn be the sequence of valuations
constructed by Algorithm 1 such that none of vi is the optimal values vec-
tor. Let Wi be the subregion containing vi and corresponding to the vi-greedy
strategies chosen in step 2 of the algorithm. Then Wi = Wj for i = j.
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Proof. Suppose that Wi = Wj = Wσ,τ for some i < j. We have vi+1 = F (v)
and vj+1 = F (v
′) where v and v′ are maximal solutions to the same set of linear
constraints. Moreover, v  vi+1  vj  v′ and therefore v = v′. It follows that
v = vi+1 = F (v) so that vi+1 is the ﬁxed point of F and hence, by Theorem 2.7,
also the optimal values vector. This contradicts our assumption. 
Observe that the maximal points of the subregions, found in step 3 of the
algorithm, form a -monotonic sequence. Therefore the sequence of subre-
gions traversed by the algorithm is a chain in a partial order induced by -wise
ordering of maximal points of these subregions. We expect that the maximal
length of such a chain is much smaller than the total number of subregions,
but so far we are unable to prove this formally.
4 Simpliﬁed Version
In each step of Algorithm 1 a linear optimization problem must be solved. This
can be done in polynomial time but the solution can be costly to compute. In
the next algorithm, we propose how to replace the linear optimization problem
by much simpler computations at the expense of performing only sub-optimal
improvements in each iteration.
Having the current valuation vi and a pair of vi-greedy strategies 〈σi, τi〉
we compute v˜i = vσi,τi which we call the limit vector. This limit vector sets a
direction in which the current valuation is increased.
If 〈σi, τi〉 are v˜i-greedy then, by Proposition 2.8, they are optimal and the
algorithm can terminate. Otherwise, we look for the maximal point vt∗ in the
segment [vi, v˜i] such that 〈σi, τi〉 are still vt∗-greedy and we take vi+1 = F (vt∗).
Such a choice of vi+1 guarantees the convergence of the constructed sequence
to vopt.
Proposition 4.1 Suppose that v ∈ Wσ,τ and that v  v˜. Let vt = (1−t) v+t v˜
for t ∈ [0, 1]. The maximal t∗ such that vt∗ ∈ Wσ,τ can be found in time O(K)
where K is the number of edges in the game graph.
Proof. For each position x we ﬁnd tx such that strategy σ/τ is vt-greedy at
x for t ∈ [0, tx] in the following way. Let x ∈ Vmax have successors y1, . . . , yk
and σ(x) = y1. Note that v0(y1) ≥ v0(yj) for all j, since σ is v-greedy at x.
Inequality vt(y1) ≥ vt(yj) holds for all t ∈ [0, tj ] where tj = δj · (δj − δ˜j)−1,
δj = v(y1)− v(yj) and δ˜j = v˜(y1)− v˜(yj) (if δj = δ˜j we put tj = 1). Strategy
σ is vt-greedy at x iﬀ vt(y1) ≥ vt(yj) for all j. Hence tx = minj tj , and in the
same way we can ﬁnd tx for x ∈ Vmin. Clearly t∗ = minx tx. 
This leads to the following algorithm.
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Algorithm 2 (improved iteration II)
1. Start with v1 = F (0).
2. Find vi-greedy strategies 〈σi, τi〉 and the limit vector v˜i = vσi,τi. Stop if
〈σi, τi〉 are v˜i-greedy.
3. Let vt = (1 − t) vi + t v˜i. Find t∗, the maximal t such that 〈σi, τi〉 are
vt-greedy.
4. Take vi+1 = F (vt∗) and repeat.
The convergence of the constructed sequence of valuations to the optimal
values follows from Proposition 3.2 and the following lemma
Lemma 4.2 Let v ∈ Wσ,τ and v˜ = vσ,τ . Let vt = (1− t) v + t v˜ for t ∈ [0, 1].
If strategies 〈σ, τ〉 are vt-greedy then vt ∈ Wσ,τ .
Proof. We need to prove that vt  F (vt). The limit vector v˜ = vσ,τ is a ﬁxed
point of Fσ,τ . From v ∈ Wσ,τ it follows that F (v) = Fσ,τ (v) and v  F (v). By
linearity and monotonicity of Fσ,τ we get
vt = (1− t) v + t v˜  (1− t)Fσ,τ (v) + t Fσ,τ (v˜) = Fσ,τ (vt) = F (vt) .
The last equality follows from the assumption that 〈σ, τ〉 are vt-greedy. 
Proposition 4.3 Algorithm 2 ﬁnds an optimal pair of strategies after at most
an exponential number of iterations.
Proof. Let vi be the sequence of valuations computed by Algorithm 2. As-
suming vi ∈ W we see that vi  vt∗ and, by Lemma 4.2, vt∗  F (vt∗). There-
fore, by monotonicity of F , vi+1 = F (vt∗)  F (vi+1) and hence vi+1 ∈ W .
Clearly v1 = F (0) ∈ W thus vi ∈ W for all i. Also, from vi  vt∗ it follows
that F (vi)  vi+1 for all i. By Proposition 3.2, limi→∞ vi = vopt.
We have F (vi)  vi+1  F (vi+1) and v1 = F (0), hence F i(0)  vi  vopt
for all i. Thus the convergence rate of vi is no worse than the convergence
rate of the sequence F i(0).
As noted in the proof of Theorem 2.7, operator FN is α-contracting where
N is the number of non-terminal positions in the game, α = (1−m)N and m is
the least edge probability in the game board. It follows that for i = O
(
(1/m)
N
)
the values F i(0), hence also vi, are so close to the limit vopt that any vi-
greedy strategies must be also vopt-greedy and thus optimal. At that point
the algorithm will terminate. 
Our experiments show that the number of iterations needed by Algorithm 2
to solve example games is slightly bigger but comparable with that of Algo-
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rithm 1. Hence, in practice, replacing the exact solution of the linear con-
straints problem by a heuristic choice of vt∗ seems to work well. Unfortunately,
with this approach, the argument of Proposition 3.3 is no longer valid and, at
least in principle, it is possible that Algorithm 2 traverses several times the
same subregion during its search for the optimal values.
We note that a similar modiﬁcation of the value iteration method is de-
scribed in [1] in the context of Markov decision processes (i.e., single player
stochastic games) as “generic rank-one corrections”. 5 In this scheme, the
current valuation is increased along a ﬁxed vector d in each iteration, so that
vi+1 = F (vi + γd). However, the diﬃculty of this method lies in the correct
choice of vector d which entails guessing the optimal values and correcting this
guess during iterations.
In contrast, our algorithm uses the easily computable limit vector to deter-
mine the direction in which to improve the current valuation in each iteration.
We also use a simple and general criteria (Proposition 3.2) which guarantees
convergence of the modiﬁed sequence to the optimal values and works for
single as well as two-player games.
5 Strategy Improvement Algorithms
None of the known methods for solving simple stochastic games has satisfac-
tory complexity analysis. It seems though, that one of the simplest methods,
the strategy improvement, works particularly well in practice. We decided
to use strategy improvement algorithms as yardsticks to measure eﬃciency of
our new algorithms.
The strategy improvement method is based on improving an initial, ar-
bitrary strategy for one player, say max, by updating it at nodes at which
it doesn’t make optimal choices. Given a strategy σ, let vσ(x) be the best
payoﬀ player max can achieve in a game starting at x in which he uses σ.
A position x ∈ Vmax is switchable if there exists a successor y of x such that
vσ(y) > vσ(x). If this is the case, then the current strategy σ is updated to
choose position y at x. After updating the current strategy at all switchable
positions the whole process is repeated.
From this general schema we get diﬀerent algorithms by using diﬀerent
methods for determining the values vσ(x). One method is to use the same
strategy improvement technique to solve a one-player game resulting from
ﬁxing max choices according to the strategy σ. This leads to the following
algorithm:
5 I would like to thank the anonymous referee for pointing out this reference.
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Algorithm 3 (strategy improvement I)
1. Choose arbitrary strategies σ and τ for max and min, respectively.
2. Find an optimal min counter-strategy for σ by updating τ in the following
process:
(a) compute vσ,τ by solving linear equations v = Fσ,τ (v),
(b) for any min position x having a successor y such that vσ,τ (y) <
vσ,τ (x) set τ
′(x) = y,
(c) set τ ′(x) = τ(x) for all remaining x ∈ Vmin,
(d) if τ ′ = τ then set τ ← τ ′ and repeat from (b).
3. Update strategy σ based on the valuation vσ,τ . That is, for any x ∈ Vmax
if x has a successor y with vσ,τ (y) > vσ,τ (x) then set σ
′(x) = y. Otherwise
set σ′(x) = σ(x).
4. If σ′ = σ then strategies σ and τ are optimal. Otherwise set σ ← σ ′ and
repeat from 2.
The advantage of this version of the algorithm is its simplicity. Besides solving
the system of linear equations, one needs only to compare values of game
positions and update strategies accordingly. On the other hand, nothing is
known about the worst case complexity of this method. In principle, each
improvement of the max strategy σ can cost exponentially many iterations of
the inner loop in step 2. But in practice , despite its simplicity, the algorithm
performs surprisingly well.
The other version of the algorithm uses linear programming to ﬁnd payoﬀs
vσ(x) in polynomial time. Determining the optimal values of a single-player
stochastic game, also known as a Markov decision process, by solving a sys-
tem of linear constraints is a well established technique which can be directly
applied here.
Algorithm 4 (strategy improvement II)
1. Choose arbitrary strategy σ for max.
2. Find expected payoﬀs vσ for player max using strategy σ by solving the
following optimization problem: maximize
∑
x vσ(x) under constraints
vσ(x) ≤ v¯σ(y) for x ∈ Vmin and x → y,
vσ(x) = v¯σ
(
σ(x)
)
for x ∈ Vmax,
vσ(x) =
∑
x→y
q(x, y) v¯σ(y) for x ∈ Vavg,
vσ(x) ≤ 1 for all x.
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Fig. 2. Sorting games SGn. For readibility edges connecting each average position xi to the
corresponding “output position” yi were omited.
3. Update strategy σ to σ′ based on the valuation vσ found in 2.
4. If σ′ = σ then vσ = vopt. Otherwise set σ ← σ′ and repeat from 2.
As with our algorithms, each iteration of Algorithm 4 takes a polynomial time.
But we note again, that the cost of solving linear constraint problems can be
high in practice.
6 Experiments
We tested our algorithms on a family of simple stochastic games which we
call sorting games. These games seem to be non-trivial for solving by various
methods.
A sorting game board SGn has n average positions x1, . . . , xn and n sinks
s1, . . . , sn. The strategic positions of SGn are arranged into a sorting net-
work SN n which copies values of the average nodes to the “output” positions
y1, . . . , yn, sorting them into increasing order. Figure 2 shows how the sorting
network SN n is constructed from SN n−1. As can be easily seen, network SN n
consists of n(n−1) nodes and hence board SGn has n2 non-terminal positions
and n sinks. Each average position xi in SGn is connected to the sink si with
probability 1/2i and to the corresponding position yi with probability 1−1/2i.
For games SG3, SG4 and SG5 we searched for sink payoﬀs which make
the algorithms perform a large number of iterations. We abstracted from the
details of the implementation of the algorithms and we compared only the
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number of iterations each algorithm needs to solve a game. This means that
we treated solving a linear constraint problem as an atomic operation. For
Algorithm 3 we counted the total number of strategy updates, taking into
account also the costs of the inner loop of step 2.
Results of our experiments are presented in Table 1.
Table 1
Number of iterations taken by each of the algorithms on example sorting games.
ex. no.
no. of game
positions
Alg. 1 Alg. 2 Alg. 3 Alg. 4
1 16 2 3 6 2
2 16 3 6 7 2
3 16 4 7 7 3
4 16 2 4 8 3
5 25 3 6 7 2
6 25 2 5 8 2
7 25 4 8 9 3
8 25 6 9 10 3
9 36 4 14 10 3
10 36 8 6 11 4
11 36 5 9 16 4
12 36 7 6 18 5
7 Summary
We present two algorithms for determining optimal values and strategies in
a simple stochastic game. The algorithms search for the solution of the local
optimality equations in the set W of feasible valuations. Search space W
is divided into subregions Wσ,τ corresponding to diﬀerent pairs of strategies.
Our ﬁrst algorithm uses linear optimization techniques to advance to a new
subregion in each iteration. The second algorithm replaces exact solutions of
the optimization problems by easily computable heuristics.
We prove correctness of both algorithms. A single iteration of each of
the algorithms can be done in a polynomial time. Hence the complexity of
the algorithms depends mainly on the number of iterations required to ﬁnd
the solution. We provide exponential bounds for this number and give some
indications why it could be much smaller in practice.
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We also tested our algorithms on example games and compared them with
the well known method of strategy improvement. We demonstrate that in
practice their performance is similar.
Our main contribution is a new technique for ﬁnding the optimal values of
a simple stochastic game which is comparable with the strategy improvement
method. The technique is based on a geometric interpretation of node valua-
tions as points in the hyper-cube [0, 1]N and identiﬁcation of player strategies
with the subregions of this cube. In this setting we show a diﬀerent method
for improving the current pair of strategies by advancing from one subregion
to the other in a monotonic way.
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